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THE BANK OF THE SOUTH
Santiago Ojea Quintana
I. INTRODUCTIONON December 9, 2007, in Buenos Aires, Argentina, the former
president of Argentina, Mr. Nestor Kirchner, joined the presi-
dents of Bolivia, Mr. Evo Morales, Brazil, Mr. Inacio Lula da
Silva, Ecuador, Mr. Rafael Correa, Paraguay, Mr. Nicanor Duarte Frutos,
and Venezuela, Mr. Hugo ChAvez Frfas, in signing the Bank of the
South's Foundational Act ("Act"). The purpose of the Act is to create a
development bank ("Bank of the South") to finance the economic and
social development of its members, strengthen integration, reduce ine-
qualities, and promote equitable distribution of investments among its
members.' 2 As of 2008 Chile, Colombia, and Peru have decided not to
join the new bank, though their incorporation may take place in the fu-
ture, as some of the current members have disclosed.3
The Bank of the South's head offices will be located in Caracas, Vene-
zuela, with two subsidiaries to be situated in Buenos Aires, Argentina,
and La Paz, Bolivia.4 Originally proposed by Mr. Chdivez as a Latin
American monetary and financial alternative to the International Mone-
tary Fund ("IMF") and the World Bank, creation of the Bank of the
South was quickly supported by Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador. Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay later expressed their support.
This paper analyzes whether the Bank of the South can be successfully
implemented, considering the circumstances surrounding its creation and
the differing interests of its members.5 I conclude that even though South
1. Though the President of Uruguay, Mr. Tabar6 Vdizquez, was not present in the
launching meeting, Uruguay did become a member of the Bank of the South.
2. FOUNDATIONAL AcT OF THE BANK OF THE SOUTH, provision 1 (Dec. 10, 2007)
(stating that the parties entering into the Act agree to create a development bank
called Bank of the South, the purpose of which will be to finance economic and
social development of the countries of the Union de Naciones Sudamericanas
(UNASUR), the members of the Bank, in a well-balanced and stable manner by
the use of internal and external regional savings, and to strengthen integration,
reduce inequality, and promote equitable distribution of investments among the
members).
3. Lanzan el Banco del Sur, NACION, Dec. 9, 2007, http://www.lanacion.com.ar/
nota.asp?notaid=969606.
4. FOUNDATIONAL AcT OF THE BANK OF THE SOUTH, supra note 2, at provision 2
(stating that the Bank of the South will be headquartered in Caracas, Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela, and its subsidiaries will be located in Buenos Aires, Argen-
tina, and La Paz, Bolivia).
5. Gabriel Papa, Southern Bank: Between Rhetoric and a Historic Opportunity, June
18, 2007, available at http://ifis.choike.org/informes/638.html. ("It is usually stated
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America is experiencing a favorable economic period that ought to favor
the creation of a regional financing tool like the Bank of the South, the
different interests converging into the Bank of the South will likely im-
pede its creation in a competitive and successful manner.
II. WHAT IS GOING ON IN LATIN AMERICA?
Latin America is undergoing an outstanding macro-economic period.
In April 2008, the Inter-American Development Bank ("IDB") held its
annual meeting in Miami, Florida. In his message to the gathering, the
bank's president, Luis Alberto Moreno, noted that "despite the recent
instability in international financial markets and the projected slowdown
in the U.S. economy, the outlook for Latin America and the Caribbean is
brighter than it has been in decades." '6
The emergence of China and India in the global economy, and the ro-
bust economic performance of the United States and the European
Union prior to the current subprime mortgage crisis, created an increas-
ing demand for commodities and expanded global liquidity, thereby facil-
itating new investments in Latin America. 7 As a result, the Latin
American region grew by more than 4 percent a year for the past three
years, and by 5 percent in 2006. Additionally, there has been a reduction
in the unemployment rate.8 Between 2005 and 2006, inflation also fell
from 6.1 percent to 4 percent. 9
For most of the regional economies within Latin America, the cost of
capital is the cheapest it has been in two decades. 10 Currently, many of
these economies may be better served by private banks than by Interna-
tional Financial Institutions ("IFIs"), since it is very difficult for IFIs to
compete on price against private banks.'I Several countries in the region
have taken advantage of the growing trend of investment in Latin
that Latin American governments - in the face of non-fulfilment [sic] of the many
goals periodically set regarding regional integration - react by setting even more
ambitious goals. Within the kingdom of 'magic realism', rhetoric usually takes
place of the patient setting up of institutions and long-standing commitments. It is
with this kind of scepticism [sic] that most part of the regional public opinion,
analysts, and even governments, have undertaken the proposal to set up the Bank
of the South.")
6. Luis Alberto Moreno, President, Inter-America Development Bank, IDB Annual
Report 2007: Message from the President (2007) (transcript available at http://
www.iadb.org/exr/ar2007/message2.cfm?language=English).
7. Jose Miguel Insulza, Challenges for Latin America and the Caribbean. A View from
the Perspective of the Fifth Summit of the Americas, in TOWARD THE FIFTH SUMMIT
OF THE AMERICAS. REGIONAL CHALLENGES 9, 10 (Joint Summit Working Group





10. Alexei Barrionuevo, Chdvez's Plan for Development Bank Moves Ahead, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 2007, at A3, available at http:llwww.nytimes.com/2007110/22/worldl
americasi22bank.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&oref=slogin.
11. Hugo Chavez Moves into Banking, ECONOMIST, May 10, 2007, at 39.
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America and the low interest rates available in the markets by accumulat-
ing international reserves. This has substantially improved the currency
and maturity composition, and helped maintain current account and pri-
mary fiscal surpluses. 12 The enlargement of budget surpluses and the in-
crease in international reserves have aided some Latin American
countries in raising their credit ratings and reducing their debt-to-GDP
ratio.' 3
Similarly, most of the countries in South America have diminished
their exposure to the influence of IFIs. Only Peru and Paraguay have
entered into new stand-by agreements with the IMF in 2007.14 Argentina
and Brazil have taken advantage of their economic growth and high com-
modity prices to pay off their debt to the IMF, 15 as have Venezuela, 16
Uruguay, and Ecuador. 17 Whereas in 2005, 80 percent of the eighty-one
billion dollar loan portfolio managed by the IMF was allocated to Latin
America, today, only 1 percent of the portfolio is tied to that region.' 8
Furthermore, as illustrated in the chart below, demand for the World
Bank Group's loans in Latin American and the Caribbean is faltering.' 9
Despite the favorable macroeconomic progress that Latin America is
experiencing, the main challenge the region should face in the coming
years is to transform the present growth trend into sustainable and equi-
table growth, thus reducing poverty and inequality.20 The achievement of
this goal will require, among other structural reforms, new and greater
investment in infrastructure, energy, health systems, and education. 21
12. World Bank, A New Opportunity to Overcome Old Problems, in Toward the Fifth
Summit of the Americas: Regional Challenges 53, 56 (Joint Summit Working




14. Vince McElhinny, Bank of the South, BANK INFORMATION CENTER, November 29,
2007, available at http://www.biceca.org/en/Article.565.aspx.
15. Hugo Chavez Moves into Banking, supra note 12.
16. More Equal Power Distribution in Banco del Sur Demanded by Venezuela, BANK
INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.bicusa.org/en/Institution.Policies.21.aspx.
17. Laura Luna Martinez, Banco del Sur, Oct. 2007, http://www.lanacion.com.ar/
nota.asp?notaid=969606.
18. McElhinny, supra note 15.
19. Hugo Chavez Moves into Banking, supra note 12.
20. See Insulza, supra note 8, at 12; World Bank, supra note 13, at 59; Jose Luis
Machinea, Reflections on the Economic and Social Challenges Facing Latin
America and the Caribbean, in TOWARDS THE FIFTH SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS:
REGIONAL CHALLENGES 29, 30 (Joint Summit Working Group of the Organization
of American States' Summit of the Americas ed.), available at http://www.summit-
americas.org/ASAMBLEA%20GENERAL%202007[DESFIOS english.pdf; Luis
Alberto Moreno, Toward the Fifth Summit of the Americas: Perspective on Re-
gional Challenges, in TOWARDS THE FIFTH SUMMIT OF THE AMERICAS: REGIONAL
CHALLENGES 21 (Joint Summit Working Group of the Organization of American
States' Summit of the Americas ed.), available at http://www.summit-americas.org/
ASAMBLEA%20GENERAL%202007/DESFIOS-english.pdf.
21. World Bank, supra note 13, at 60; Moreno, supra note 7, at 25-26.
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III. IS A REGIONAL FINANCING INSTITUTION A
CONTROVERSIAL PROPOSAL?
The creation of a regional financing institution, such as the Bank of the
South, for the purpose of financing development projects in the region
and taking on the negative effects caused by international financial mar-
kets crises, might well help South America consolidate the growth period
that is experiencing. Indeed, this idea is supported by various sectors. 22
Some believe that a regional financing institution is necessary to coun-
terbalance the influence of Bretton Woods institutions in South America,
groups held primarily responsible for the economic failures the region has
experienced to date.23 Over the past decades, both the IMF and the
World Bank have encouraged Latin American economies to adopt free-
market capitalism and curtail social spending. This resulted in wide-
spread anger over "what was broadly seen as outside interference that
enriched foreign companies. ' '24 Hence, the IMF and World Bank are
now seen as dominated by the United States, and as having imposed the
"Washington Consensus" of macroeconomic stability at the expense of
other, more important, priorities.2 5
22. Papa, supra note 5.
23. Lourdes Heredia, Why South America Wants a New Bank, BBC NEWS, Dec. 10,
2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7068124.stm.
24. Simon Romero, Brazil's Objections Slow Chavez's Plan for Regional Bank, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/22/world/ameri-
cas/22altbank.html?_r=l&scp=l&sq=brazil's%20objections% 20slow%20chavez's
%20plan&st=cse&oref=slogin.
25. Hugo Chavez Moves into Banking, supra note 12 (this vision also receives support
from Mark Weisbrot, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research,
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Furthermore, credibility upon the soundness of the policy reform pro-
grams of IFIs is dramatically decreasing with the recent financial crises
hitting the international markets. It has been pointed out that "at the
beginning of this decade, scepticism [sic] in Latin America was sealed
when Argentina disregarded IMF advice by defaulting on its debt and
then experienced robust economic recovery. '26 Venezuela's Minister of
Finance, Rodrigo Cabezas, has further stated that 'if the IMF does not
abandon its record of implementing tough policies with regards [sic] to
emerging countries and being totally benevolent to developed countries,
as it was in the last U.S. mortgage crisis, it will struggle to regain its
credibility.'27
In addition, since the breakthrough of the Asiatic crisis in 1997, there
has been a constant call from developing economies to reform interna-
tional financial architecture, which has not yet been implemented. 28 Fur-
thermore, despite calls from a majority of the member nations of the IMF
and the World Bank to open up the search process to permit appointment
non-American and non-European leaders of the IMF and World Bank, a
neoconservative European (Robert Zoellick) and an American (Paul
Wolfowitz) were recently appointed. 29
The "anti-Washington Consensus" sectors are not only backing imple-
mentation of regional financing alternatives, but so are some "moderate"
sectors.30 The Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for
Latin America and the Caribbean of the United Nations, Mr. Jose Luis
Machinea, has affirmed:
The financial volatility of the region's countries has been exacer-
bated by the lack of suitable mechanisms for providing emergency
financing to countries experiencing balance-of-payments financing
problems as a result of external shocks. The lack of an emergency
financing network at the regional and international level has led
countries to move towards a policy of self-insurance consisting essen-
tially in the accumulation of international reserves, which is very far
from being the most efficient option for protecting against the vagar-
ies of the world economy. In recent years there has been a flurry of
proposals for reforming world financial institutions and markets.
However, the strategies developed to improve global financial ar-
rangements have underplayed the potential role of regional financial
located in Washington D.C., who considered that "[a]lthough our foreign policy
establishment remains in cozy denial about it, the recognition that Washington's
economic policies and institutions have failed miserably in Latin America is
broadly shared among leaders in the region." Mark Weisbrot, A Bank of Their
Own: Latin America Casting off Washington's Shackles, Nov. 1, 2007, http://www.
alternet.org/columnists/story/66529/a-bank-of-theirown:_latin-america-casting.
off washington's-shackles/).
26. Heredia, supra note 24.
27. Id.
28. Weisbrot, supra note 26.
29. Id.
30. Papa, supra note 5.
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institutions.",31
Even the World Bank's vice president for Latin America, Ms. Pamela
Cox, has admitted that "The Banco del Sur is a complement, not a com-
petitor," and the World Bank's president, Mr. Robert Zoellick, has of-
fered advice to the new bank on transparency issues.32 This means that
regardless of how creation of the Bank of the South is justified, the no-
tion that a regional financing institution could operate as a window
through which funds could be rapidly mobilized to South America in or-
der to develop South American projects and assist countries affected by
external shocks, is widely supported and ineffectively criticized. 33
It could further be said that the current economic period that Latin
America is experiencing is optimum for implementation of a new re-
gional bank and, moreover, that creation of such an institution might well
help the region consolidate the growth trend that is experiencing. As
noted above, international liquidity has allowed several countries in
South America to accumulate considerable amounts of reserves which
can make establishing the Bank of the South possible.34 Both the Decla-
ration of Quito, entered into on May 3, 2007, and the Declaration of
Asunci6n, entered into on May 22, 2007, point out the historic opportu-
nity that South American countries have to create the Bank of the
South.35
Finally, it also seems indisputable that a financing institution "of their
own," such as the Bank of the South, would allow South American econ-
omies to manage their own public policy agendas, as opposed to the
Washington-oriented IFIs whose plans and major decisions are still con-
trolled by developed economies and do not always coincide with the deci-
sions and needs of developing economies. 36 Even Nobel Prize-winning
economist Joseph Stiglitz endorsed the creation of the Bank of the South,
arguing in October 2007 that "[o]ne of the advantages of having a Bank
of the South is that it would reflect the perspectives of those in the
south. '37 "It would boost Latin America's development and provide a
31. Jose Luis Machinea & Daniel Titelman, Less Volatile Growth? The Role of Re-
gional Financial Institutions, 91 CEPAL REV. 7, 8 (2007), available at http://
www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/7/29497/lcg2333iMachinea.pdf.
32. Heredia, supra note 24.
33. Papa, supra note 5.
34. Id.
35. DECLARATION OF QUITO (May 7,2007) available at http://www.cadtm.org/spip.php
?article2630 (stating that the Ministers ratified the historic opportunity held by the
countries of South America.); DECLARATION OF ASUNCION (May 22, 2007) availa-
ble at http://mef.gov.ec/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/MINISTERIO-ECONOMIA_
FINANZASECUADOR/INTEGRACION%20_SUDAMERICANA/
ARCHIVOS2007/DECLARACIONDEASUNCION.PDF (stating that there was
coincidence as to the necessity of seizing the historic opportunity that the countries
of Latin America have to carry out the constitution of the Bank of the South).
36. Papa, supra note 5.
37. Rory Carroll, Nobel Economist Endorses ChdIvez Regional Bank Plan, GUARDIAN,
Oct. 12, 2007, at 28, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2007/oct/12/
venezuela.banking.
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useful alternative to the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund."'38 "Developing nations must create their own mechanisms of fi-
nance instead of suffering under those of the IMF and the World Bank,
which are institutions of rich nations... it is time to wake up", current
Brazilian President Mr. da Silva said at a conference held in the Republic
of Congo in October 2007, despite his differences with Venezuelan Presi-
dent Mr. Ch~ivez regarding what the Bank of the South ought to be.39
At this point in the paper, the reader may be thinking that all of the
circumstances described above should result in a synergy spurring the im-
plementation of the Bank of South. Although I agree in theory with this
statement, my opinion is that other forces and conflicts coming from the
members of the new bank are blocking its creation process and, ulti-
mately, will continue to block the bank's implementation given the irrec-
oncilable positions that are generating these conflicts or forces.
IV. LET'S MOVE FROM RHETORIC TO PRACTICE
As noted by The Economist, "[r]ather than a gesture of defiance, the
bank looks like an object lesson in why South American unity is so
hard."'40 Even if the Bank of the South constitutes an attractive proposal
offering tangible benefits to South American economies, there are three
critical circumstances that, in my opinion, will block the Bank of the
South's implementation: (1) the differing and opposite motivations that
Brazil and Venezuela, two of the most influential economies in the re-
gion, have for becoming a member of the new bank; (2) the conflicts
amongst the bank's members caused by the one country, one vote system
and the contribution system that should be adopted; and finally, (3) the
effect that the "no-conditionality" premise adopted by the Bank of the
South will have upon the cost at which the bank will raise funds in the
global markets, thereby affecting its competitiveness in relation to other
multilateral institutions operating in the region.
A. POLITICAL CONSENSUS
The political and economic motivations which Brazil and Venezuela,
two of the most influential members within the Bank of the South, had
for deciding to become a member of the Bank of the South demonstrate
that a real consensus between them for purposes of creating the bank is
actually absent. In fact, it has been said that the debate over the Bank of
the South actually reflects a broader struggle between Brazil and Vene-
zuela for spreading their influence in South America. 41
From the very beginning, Venezuelan President Mr. Chivez perceived
the Bank of the South as a political tool for his "Bolivarian revolution,"
which would free other countries in the region from the "oppression" of
38. Id.
39. Weisbrot, supra note 26.
40. Bolivarian Finance, ECONOMIST, Dec. 15, 2007, at 46.
41. Hugo ChAvez Moves into Banking, supra note 12.
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Bretton Woods institutions.42 Before the launch meeting in December
2007, Mr. Chavez indicated the bank was an instrument for indepen-
dence.4 3 The current high oil prices have allowed Venezuela to adopt a
hostile position against Washington and the IFIs, even when doing so
alienates foreign investors.44 Venezuela recently paid off 3.3 billion dol-
lars of debt it owed to the World Bank4 5 and threatened that it will with-
draw from both the World Bank and the IMF, which Mr. Ch~ivez has
referred as "part of the damnation that has fallen over us, the throwing-
in, the shock-policies that spread starvation, misery and poverty and also
violence among our peoples."'46 Nonetheless, Mr. Ch~ivez has not exe-
cuted such a decision to date.47 However, Mr. Chivez has failed to note
that pulling out of the IMF "would amount a technical default on Vene-
zuela's bonds and would raise the cost of future borrowing in global mar-
kets. ''48 Moreover, walking away from the World Bank would cause
Venezuela to default on bilateral investment treaties it has signed with
many countries that use the World Bank's investment-dispute
machinery.49
Those effects might explain, therefore, why Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
and Ecuador have rejected the idea of pulling out of the IMF,50 despite
the fact that many of those countries' presidents share Mr. ChAvez's left-
ist ideology, such as Bolivian President Mr. Evo Morales, who has de-
clared that Bolivia will pull out of the World Bank's International Center
for Settlement of Disputes51, and shares Mr. Chivez's concerns about
failure of the IFIs' policy reform programs in South America.
Even though Mr. ChAvez has not been able to convince the other mem-
bers to quit the IMF, he can likely count on the fact that in every other
matter Bolivia and Ecuador will support Venezuela's positions regarding
the Bank of the South.52 Moreover, Mr. Chivez might also be able to
rely on Argentina's vote, considering the benefits that it is gaining by
exporting food to Venezuela, 53 though it has been said that Argentina is
trying to hedge its alliances with both Venezuela and Brazil to ensure that
neither gains the upper hand in regional politics. 54
It is the positions of Chile and Brazil however, which might jeopardize
42. Bolivarian Finance, supra note 41.
43. Lanzan el Banco del Sur, supra note 3.
44. Hugo Chtvez Moves into Banking, supra note 12.
45. More Equal Power Distribution in Banco del Sur Demanded by Venezuela, supra
note 17.
46. Lanzan el Banco del Sur, supra note 3.
47. Heredia, supra note 24.
48. Id.
49. Hugo Chdvez Moves into Banking, supra note 12.
50. Id.
51. More Equal Power Distribution in Banco del Sur Demanded by Venezuela, supra
note 17.
52. Bolivarian Finance, supra note 41.
53. Barrionuevo, supra note 11.
54. More Equal Power Distribution in Banco del Sur Demanded by Venezuela, supra
note 17.
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successful implementation of the Bank of the South.55 Chile has attended
some of the negotiation meetings as an observer but it has not joined Mr.
ChAvez's initiative. 56 It has been said that the absence of Chile, the
twenty-sixth most competitive economy in the world and the first most
competitive in Latin America, according to the 2008 Report on Interna-
tional Competitiveness published by the International Institute for Man-
agement Development, 57  constitutes a major impediment to
implementation of the Bank of the South. 58 Brazil was originally against
creation of the Bank of the South, and even though lately it has gone
along with the new bank, it has also been trying to retard the creation
process.59 Historically, Brazil's President Mr. Lula da Silva did little to
limit Mr. Chdvez' s influence in the region, in part for the purpose of
looking good in front of his leftist-oriented Worker's Party.60 However,
Brazil has recently distanced itself from Venezuela as a result of Mr. Chd-
vez's assaults on Venezuelan democracy. 61 Brazil's communication min-
ister has expressly condemned Mr. Chdivez's assaults on the Venezuelan
media,62 and stemming from the RCTV case, 63 the Brazilian Senate has
yet to clear the way for Venezuela's incorporation into the Common
South Market (MERCOSUR). 64 Mr. Chavez has expressly criticized the
use of food crops to develop ethanol-based fuels, a strategic keystone of
Brazil's economy. 65
Even though both Mr. Lula da Silva and Mr. Chivez come from left-
wing parties, the former has been moving towards a more pragmatic and
market friendly government such as those of Chile and Peru. 66 In fact,
Mr. Lula da Silva has built a good relationship with U.S. President
George W. Bush, motivated by their mutual strategic interest in develop-
ing ethanol-based energy projects and diversifying part of the Brazilian
55. Martinez, supra note 18.
56. Lanzan el Banco del Sur, supra note 3.
57. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT, THE WORLD
COMPETITIVENESS SCOREBOARD 2008 (2008), http://www.imd.ch/research/publica-
tions/wcy/upload/scoreboard.pdf.
58. Martinez, supra note 18.
59. Bolivarian Finance, supra note 41.
60. Hugo Chdvez Moves into Banking, supra note 12.
61. Id.
62. Id., Simon Romero, Brazil's Objections Slow Chdvez's Plan for Regional Bank,
N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2007, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/22/
world/americas/22altbank.html?_r=l&oref=slogin.
63. The RCTV arose after Brazil's Senate issued a declaration criticizing Mr. Chavez's
decision not to renew the broadcast license held by RCTV (a private company).
Mr. Chavez immediately contested such declaration linking Brazil's Senate's posi-
tion with the United State's interests in the region. To get more information about
this verbal exchange, see Chris Carlson, RCTV Case Causes Tensions Between Bra-
zil and Venezuela, VENEZUELANALYSIS, June 4, 2007, http://www.venezuelanalysis.
com/news/2427.
64. Kiraz Janicke, Venezuela Membership in Mercosur and CAN Still in Doubt,
VENEZUELANALYSIS, Sept. 28, 2007, http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/2656.
65. Romero, supra note 63.
66. Hugo Chdvez Moves into Banking, supra note 12; Romero, supra note 63.
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and American energy matrix into such a source of energy. 67 From an-
other viewpoint, Brazil already has its own development bank, the Na-
tional Bank of Economic and Social Development of Brazil ("BNDES"),
"whose lending of 62.5 billion reais ($37 billion) in the 12 months to Sep-
tember [2007] was 50% greater than that of the World Bank in the same
period. '68 The BNDES president declared that he would propose crea-
tion of a fund through his bank, whose purpose would be to finance inte-
gration projects in Brazil and South America with the World Bank and
the Inter-American Development Bank, which raises the question of
whether the Bank of the South would duplicate the BNDES's mission
and whether the lending power of the BNDES makes any other regional
alternative obsolete. 69
Finally, Brazilian diplomats are afraid that the Bank of the South will
make soft, politically driven loans that will go unpaid. 70 "Brazil wants to
avoid showing that it is somehow part of a Chivez-led institution that is
making loans for projects that are being judged more for their political
ideology than for their economic viability", said Peter Hakim, president
of the Inter-American Dialogue, a policy group in Washington D.C. that
focuses on Latin America. 71 In this regard, whereas Mr. Chivez's con-
ception of the Bank of the South excludes any participation of its techni-
cal staff in the decision process, Brazil's position is that such technocrats
are precisely the people who should staff the bank, 72 and that the Bank of
the South should adopt conventional banking standards. 73
So, even though the Venezuelan Minister of Finance has said that the
very first element necessary to found the Bank of the South has been
successfully achieved, namely, the political will of the South American
Governments to create this institution,74 doubts have been raised about
the extent to which Brazil is truly and actually committed to the creation
of the Bank of the South.75 Eric Toussaint, who has actively participated
in the new bank's negotiation process, clearly illustrates the extent to
which Brazil is actually committed to the new bank:
Brazil has joined the Bank of the South because it cannot be absent
from it: if the foundations of the Bank of the South had not been laid
on the initiative of Venezuela and Argentina, Brazil would never
have given it any thought. But to maintain its regional economic
67. Hugo Chdvez Moves into Banking, supra note 12.
68. Bolivarian Finance, supra note 41.
69. More Equal Power Distribution in Banco del Sur Demanded by Venezuela, supra
note 17.
70. Bolivarian Finance, supra note 41.
71. Barrionuevo, supra note 11.
72. Bolivarian Finance, supra note 41.
73. More Equal Power Distribution in Banco del Sur Demanded by Venezuela, supra
note 17.
74. Rodrigo Cabezas, Venez. Minister of Fin., Remarks Regarding the Bank of the
South (Oct. 23, 2007) (audio recording available at http:llwww.cepr.netlindex.phpl
event-bank-of-the-south-an-alternative-to-the-imf-and-world-bank. . .october-23-
2007/).
75. Martinez, supra note 18.
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dominance Brazil cannot stay away from the Bank of the South. If
we look at it from the viewpoint of Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia,
it is easy to understand why these governments are interested in hav-
ing Brazil in the Bank of the South, because it is an important eco-
nomic power and because a series of progressive governments in the
region wish to maintain good relations with Brazil so that it does not
strengthen its ties with the United States, which would weaken the
region vis-A-vis American aggressivity [sic]. A truly diplomatic and
geo-strategic game is being played. In a more ideal world, the Bra-
zilian government would adopt a truly leftist policy - an alternative
to its alliance with the US and its support for the agro-exporting in-
dustry and for an export-based policy which is set on conquering the
markets of the region. But that is a far cry from reality. 76
Although Brazil's commitment to the Bank of the South might be
weak, the fact is that Brazil has joined the proposal. Two reasons have
been given to explain Brazil's participation. First, as noted by Mr. Tous-
saint's comments, Brazilian diplomats realized that Brazil could never
have remained outside a South American institution, especially a wealthy
one.77 "[T]he impression is that its decision [to participate in the Bank of
the South] results from the perception that Brazil cannot remain aside of
irreversible political events, rather than from an option politically in-
spired in favor of a sovereign and supportive integration process of the
South American peoples."'78 Instead of rejecting the idea of creating a
regional institution, Brazil's diplomats have worked to limit the new
bank's remit and to slow its creation process.79 Second, Brazil's adher-
ence to the Bank of the South is explained by its business interests in the
economy of Venezuela. 80  Brazilian Finance Minister Mr. Guido
Mantenga said in 2007 that although Brazil had shown less interest in
creation of the bank because Brazil has the greatest credit capacity, "we
continue to support the project because it will benefit our commercial
partners and Brazilian businesses."'81 Brazilian companies currently have
substantial interests in the Venezuelan economy. 82 Brazil's exports to
Venezuela rose by 60 percent last year.83 Odbrecht, a Brazilian construc-
tion company, has built a new metro line in Caracas and a bridge over the
Orinoco, and is building a $2.5 billion hydroelectric dam.8 4 Braskem,
Odebrecht's petrochemicals arm, has a three billion dollar partnership
with state-owned Pequiven that includes building two plants to produce
plastic resins. Companhia Vale do Rio Doce is eyeing Venezuela's min-
76. 1 ric Toussaint, Two Opposite Tendencies at Play in Latin America, May 20, 2007,
http://www.cadtm.org/article.php3?id-article=2655.
77. Bolivarian Finance, supra note 41.
78. Martinez, supra note 18.
79. Bolivarian Finance, supra note 41.
80. Hugo Chavez Moves into Banking, supra note 12.
81. Barrionuevo, supra note 11.
82. Bolivarian Finance, supra note 41.
83. Hugo Chavez Moves into Banking, supra note 12..
84. Id.
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eral riches.85
To sum up, the absence of Chile in the Bank of the South is evidence
that not all of the most competitive economies of the region are partici-
pating in the project and, consequently, doubts exist as to the soundness
of the Bank of the South. More importantly, Brazil's conduct to date
suggests that its commitment to the Bank of the South is actually weak,
and that its interest is designed to counterbalance Mr. Chavez's influence
in the region. Without a strong commitment from Brazil, the strongest
economy in Latin America, the Bank of the South existence would be
precarious.
The obstacles that Brazil's position can introduce to the creation of the
new bank, as conceived by the other members, first showed up when they
had to decide whether or not the Bank of the South would comply with a
monetary function. As early as the presidential elections of 1998-1999,
Mr. Chdivez proposed creation of a regional organization in which all
South American reserves could be pooled. The goal of the regional or-
ganization would be to replace the IMF in South America, playing a cen-
tral role in regional monetary policy 86 and to provide a balance of
payments support in crisis situations. 87
Ecuador's Rafael Correa supported Mr. Chivez's ideas for the new
bank, arguing that it should combine the emergency-aid functions of the
IMF with the project lending of the World Bank and the IBD. 88 Moreo-
ver, Ecuador's Minister of Economy and Finances, Mr. Ricardo Patifio,
declared that the collection of international reserves that Argentina, Bo-
livia, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Venezuela deposited in American
and European banks added up to approximately $164 billion, which
should be used for the regional monetary stabilization fund.
89
The idea of creating a monetary institution was expressed in the docu-
ments prepared at the beginning of the negotiation process. The Second
Provision of the Declaration of Quito states that the parties agreed to
analyze the possibility of continuing to strengthen the Latin American
Reserve Fund by integrating new partners and/or creating new instru-
ments.90 Similarly, the Declaration of Paraguay stated the parties agreed
85. Id.
86. More Equal Power Distribution in Banco del Sur Demanded by Venezuela, supra
note 17.
87. Vince McElhinny, A Look into the Bank of the South, Due to Launch in December
2007, Bank Information Center Info Brief (Bank Information Center, Washington,
D.C.) Nov., 2007, http://www.bicusa.org/en/Article.3573.aspx.
88. Hugo Chavez Moves into Banking, supra note 12.
89. Bank of the South: Financial Independence for South America, July 16, 2007, http:l/
ifis.choike.org/informes/666.html.
90. DECLARATION OF QuiTo, supra note 36 (stating the members' agreement to ana-
lyze the potential for advancing the stabilization fund by strengthening the Latin
American Reserve Fund (LARF) by integrating new partners and/or creating new
instruments).
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to "move forward" in relation to such idea.9 1 Brazil, however, rejected
the idea of the Bank of the South becoming a lender of last resort. Bra-
zil's Finance Minister Mr. Guido Mantenga had already rejected the idea
that the new bank could provide financial first-aid without the tough con-
ditions the IMF imposes, calling for "modesty and parsimony" in any new
body.92 Because of Brazil's lack of support for a regional bank supplying
monetary functions, no consensus was possible between the members on
this issue. Under the Declaration of Rio de Janeiro, signed by the Minis-
ters of Economy, Finances and Treasury of the current seven members of
the Bank of the South, on October 8, 2007, the parties agreed that the
new institution would be only a "development bank".93
Venezuala's Minister of Finances has declared that the debate as to
whether or not the Bank of the South must act as regional monetary fund
might be taken up again in four or five years, 94 although a commitment to
continue evaluating monetary fund functionality was not included in the
Declaration of Rio de Janeiro or in the Foundational Act. Certainly, the
limited scope of the Bank of the South has, to some extent, destroyed its
innovative content and eliminated a function that none of the other banks
operating in the region comply with.
Venezuela's Minister of Finance has said that the Bank of the South
would provide the region with its own development bank, which it does
not have at the moment.95 The Bank of the South may also help tackle
the "neoliberal paradigm," whereby capital generated in South America
allegedly migrate to developed economies in the way of dividends, pay-
ments of interests and/or patents, instead of remaining in the region, sup-
porting regional development. 96 However, other South American
development institutions are improving their performance fairly well and
pursuing the same purposes that the Bank of South would pursue in the
region. The Andean Development Bank ("CAF") has lent over half of
its total portfolio (three billion dollars) in South America, which repre-
sents 50 percent of all MDB lending.97 Even Venezuela, which virtually
ceased borrowing from the Inter-American Development Bank, the
World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund in 2000, has main-
tained an annual flow of $650 million coming from the CAF.98 Brazil's
own development bank, the BNDES, has also become a force in the re-
91. DECLARATION OF ASUNCION, supra note 36 (stating the members' agreement to
make progress towards a stabilization and guaranty fund by integrating new ex-
isting funds and/or creating new instruments).
92. Hugo Chavez Moves into Banking, supra note 12.
93. DECLARATION OF RIo DE JANEIRO (Oct. 8, 2007) (stating that the Ministers
agreed the new institution would be a development bank with South American
character being the central feature of new financial architecture in the region).
94. Cabezas, supra note 75.
95. Id.
96. Martinez, supra note 18.
97. VINCE MCELHINNY, BANCO DEL SUR: A REFLECTION OF DECLINING IFI RELE-
VANCE IN LATIN AMERICA (2007), http://www.bicusa.org/en/article.3299.aspx.
98. Id.
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gion and lent thirty-four billion dollars in 2006 for Brazilian projects. 99
Furthermore, Venezuala's president declared that he would propose cre-
ating a fund through his bank, with a purpose that seems to duplicate
those of the Bank of the South. 1° °
Being just a development bank, it would be hard for the Bank of the
South to compete against other institutions, due to its relative inexperi-
ence and lack of expertise. Mark Shifter, Vice President for Policy at the
Inter-American Dialogue in Washington, an entity focused on Latin
America, stated that "There's the concern that [the Bank of the South]
will be a sham if its lending policies are driven by politics and personal
loyalty, particularly when there are institutions indigenous to the region
that are functioning well." 10 1
To conclude, an issue that has not been raised is what actions the Bank
of the South is planning to carry out in order to counterbalance a compet-
itive alternative to the signaling function to international markets that the
IMF continues to perform today. 10 2 Many lenders still base their deci-
sions on the IMF's blessing, usually in the form of a stand-by agreement
in compliance or a clean Article IV report.10 3 Balancing the IMF's influ-
ence upon the region requires not only creation of a regional monetary
fund, but also an alternative source of economic advice and risk assess-
ment that diminishes the IMF hegemony upon development finance gate
keeping. 10 4
It is worth considering the Chiang Mai Initiative ("CMI"), an experi-
ment in 2000 in which the Finance Ministers of ASEAN countries and
China, Japan, and South Korea ("ASEAN +3") agreed to provide liquid-
ity support for the member countries that experienced balance of pay-
ment difficulties in order to prevent an extreme crisis or systemic failure
in a country and subsequent regional contagion, as occurred in the 1997
Asian financial crisis. 10 5 The CMI involves an expanded ASEAN Swap
Arrangement (from five members to ten) and a network of bilateral swap
arrangements among ASEAN +3 countries. Paradoxically, drawing most
funds through swaps is conditioned on the achievement of an agreement
with the IMF, which conditions financing upon the implementation of
policy reforms by the borrower, some of which are fairly strict. 10 6 In re-
sponse to objections raised to what is called "the IMF link" by the Malay-
sian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, the members further agreed
that borrowing up to 10 percent of the available swaps would not require
99. Barrionuevo, supra note 11.
100. Id.
101. Romero, supra note 25.
102. McElhinny, supra note 88.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Yung Chul Park, Beyond the Chiang Mai Initiative: Rationale and Need for Deci-
sion-Making Body and Extended Regional Surveillance under the ASEAN+3
Framework, Nov., 2000, http://econ.korea.ac.kr/prof/ycpark/files/00bc.pdf.
106. PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, THE CHIANG MAI INITIA-
TIVE, http:l/www.iie.comlpublications/chapters-preview/345/3iie3381.pdf.
THE BANK OF THE SOUTH
IMF approval. 10 7 It has been argued that most of the Asian countries do
not feel they have the economic surveillance capacity that the IMF has
provided and, even more important, that the conditionality upon the In-
ternational Monetary Fund's supervision was intended to prevent lax eco-
nomic policies.10
8
B. CAPITALIZATION AND VOTING STRUCTURE
The Bank of the South is projected to raise seven billion U.S. dollars
from its current seven members as initial capital.' 0 9 Although this contri-
bution exceeds Latin American contributions to the IDB by two billion
dollars, it is still a small fraction of the latter's 100 billion dollar operating
"callable" capital that could be raised through non-regional member con-
tributions and frequent bond issues on international markets. 110 Moreo-
ver, the Bank of the South's initial proposed capital is more than the
CAF's five billion dollar callable capital and three billion dollar paid-in
capital' 1 ' and not much less than the almost eight billion dollar BNDES'
callable capital.'12
Beyond the initial capital on which the new bank will be based, the
most difficult issue its members have been debating, which contribution
system should be adopted, illustrates, once again, how distant the posi-
tions among some members are. According to the Sixth Provision of the
Foundational Act signed in Buenos Aires in December 2007, the Finance
Minister of each country-member will carry out, within sixty days as from
the signing date, all the measures necessary to finish drafting the bank's
organizational agreement. 1 3 An Argentine Government representative
said that the "document will establish a series of details, including the
system of contributions and, if they are different, how will the weight [sic]
of each nation in decision-making." 1 4 However, two positions exist
among members of the new bank as to how contributions ought to be:
some support an equal-contribution system while others prefer a non-
equal contribution system.11 5
The debate as to each country's contribution is directly related to the
voting system that has been adopted for the new bank. The fifth provi-
sion of the Foundational Act states that each member of the Bank of the
South will have "equal representation" within the board "under a demo-
107. Id.
108. McElhinny, supra note 88.
109. Barrionuevo, supra note 11.
110. McElhinny, supra note 88.
111. Sobra CAF en Cifras, http://www.caf.com/view/index.asp?pageMS=34163&ms=17.
112. BYLAWS OF BANCO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO ECONOMICO E SOCIAL -
BNDES, ARTICLE 6, http://www.bndes.gov.br/english/bndesbylaws.pdf
("BNDES's equity capital is composed of R$ 13,879,407,032.73 ... divided into
6,273,711,452 ... registered shares with no face value.").
113. FOUNDATIONAL ACT OF THE BANK OF THE SOUTH, supra note 4.
114. Seis Presidentes Firman Acta Fundacional de Banco del Sur, PAlS, Dec. 9, 2007.
115. Id.
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cratic system." 1 6 Before the launching meeting in Buenos Aires, the
Venezuelan Finance Minister Mr. Cabezas declared that each member
would have one vote in both the political and administrative management
boards of the bank.1 17 The rationale of such a rule was explained by Mr.
Cabezas in a conference held in Washington D.C., in October, 2007: "No
one, by themselves, will be the owner of Bank of the South", he said. 1 8
It is worth of mentioning that such a voting structure presents an im-
portant difference in relation to the Washington-oriented IFIs, where
votes are awarded in proportion to the contributions of each member,
thus favoring U.S. and European non-borrowing members.119 Whereas
the U.S. controls 30 percent of the Inter-American Development Bank's
Board vote share and about 17 percent of World Bank and International
Monetary Fund shares, the eight countries forming the Bank of the South
control less than four percent of IMF Board, less than 6 percent at the
World Bank, and 33 percent at the IDB. 120
However, despite such advantages, a one country, one vote system
gives few incentives to larger economies, such as that of Brazil, to con-
tribute more funds than the weaker economies. Different proposals de-
fining the contribution system were presented during the negotiations of
the Bank of the South, but again, no consensus was possible among the
members. First, Brazil and Argentina proposed that each member con-
tribute the same amount of funds, because they have the same voting
rights as all the other members.' 21 So, if the projected initial capital was
seven billion dollars, each of the seven members would have to contrib-
ute one billion dollars. Such amount would be higher than the amount
that Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay currently contribute to the Inter-
American Development Bank as ordinary capital ($920.4 million, 122
$556.8 million,1 23 and $435.8 million124 respectively), though lower than
the amount contributed by the remaining members of the Bank of the
South (Uruguay: $1,164.2 million 125; Argentina: $10,858.9 million 2 6; Bra-
116. FOUNDATIONAL ACT OF THE BANK OF THE SOUTH, supra note 4, provision five.
117. Cabezas, supra note 75.
118. Id.
119. McElhinny, supra note 15.
120. Id.
121. REDEBRASIL, BANCO DEL SUR: UNA PERSPECTIVA DE INTEGRACION DESDE LOS
PUEBLOS [BANK OF THE SOUTH: A PEOPLE'S PERSPECTIVE OF INTEGRATION]
(2007), http://www.rbrasil.org.br/file/919.pdf.
122. Inter-American Development Bank, Bolivia - Membership, http://www.iadb.org/




125. Inter-American Development Bank, Uruguay - Membership, http://www.iadb.org/
countries/membership.cfm?idscountry=UR&language=English (last visited Sep. 3,
2008).
126. Inter-American Development Bank, Argentina - Membership, http://www.iadb.
org/countries/membership.cfm?id country=AR&language=English (last visited
Sept. 3, 2008).
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zil: $10,858.9 million 127; Venezuela: $5,817.8 million 28). Ecuador, Bo-
livia, Paraguay, and Uruguay opposed the foregoing criteria. 129
Second, Argentina and Brazil came up with a second proposal whereby
the major economies would contribute more to the Bank of the South
more than the smaller economies 30 and have more voting rights in the
administrative management board, which is supposed to manage the
bank on a day-to-day basis, but not on the political management
board.' 3' This proposal was fervently criticized for jeopardizing the
"democratic principle" adopted in the Quito Declaration and reproduc-
ing the unequal system adopted by the IFIs, whereby the most powerful
economies dominate the policies and main decisions of the financial insti-
tutions.132 The proposal was again refused by Ecuador, Bolivia, Para-
guay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 133
Third, Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay proposed the contri-
butions be proportional to the size of the economy of each country-mem-
ber, without affecting its voting rights. 34 Each country would have to put
in 10 percent of its respective international reserves, although it has not
been reported if such reserves would be considered either as paid in capi-
tal or callable capital. 135 Not without reason, Brazil resisted equal voting
rights even with unequal contributions. 36 Were 10 percent of reserves to
be designated as callable capital, Brazil would allocate far more than
other smaller economies such as Bolivia or Ecuador ($16 million versus
$400 million), not to mention the fact that the new bank's total capital
would be at least ten times higher than the seven billion dollar figure
initially proposed. 37
In addition, Ecuador proposed that each member should not contrib-
ute less than the respective contribution each country has in the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, the World Bank, or the Inter-American
Development Bank.1 38 However, little has been reported as to whether
such criteria refers to contributions to a single institution or combined
contributions. Moreover, even if the Bank of the South is capitalized
through the total funds that each member actually contributes to the fore-
127. Inter-American Development Bank, Brazil - Membership, http://www.iadb.org/
countries/membership.cfm?idscountry=BR&anguage=English (last visited Sept.
3, 2008).
128. Inter-American Development Bank, Venezuela - Membership, http://www.iadb.
org/countries/membership.cfm?id-country=VE&Ianguage=English (last visited
Sept. 3, 2008)
129. REDEBRASIL, supra note 122.
130. Oscar Ugarteche, El Banco del Sur: La lucha de los Grandes Contra los Chicos
[Bank of the South: The Struggle Against the Big Boys], Jan. 10, 2008, http://
alainet.org/active/21572.
131. REDEBRASIL, supra note 122.
132. Id.; Ugarteche, supra note 132.
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going IFIs (in the case of the Inter-American Development Bank, as
paid-in capital), the new bank's capital would be $403 million, pretty
much less than the seven billion dollar projected capital mentioned
above. Brazil and Argentina, under this hypo, would still be the major
contributors followed by Venezuela, Ecuador, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Par-
aguay. No information was released as to the adoption of these criteria,
so it is reasonable to assume that it did not receive support from all of the
members.
Finally, Venezuela came up with a set of all-encompassing criteria: con-
tributions should be (i) proportional to the countries' relative share of the
regional economy or regional population, (ii) voluntary, and (iii) no less
than that made to the IFIs. 139 It was not clarified whether the denomina-
tor that would be used when defining the first criteria would be the econ-
omy or population of all South American countries or only that of all the
members of the Bank of the South. 140 Again, little information was re-
leased to the public as to how those three criteria should be defined and
mixed, but whatever the denominator is, Brazil would be required to con-
tribute over half of all initial contributions and as much as 120 times more
than the smallest member would contribute. 141
Therefore, the contribution system is another line dividing Brazil's in-
terests on the one hand, and other smaller economies such as that of Bo-
livia or Ecuador on the other hand, the latter of which can count on the
support of Venezuela. There is no reason for Brazil to accept a system in
which it will have to contribute more funds than the other economies
without gaining more control of the bank as a result. However, were Bra-
zil's position accepted, tying voting power and contribution, the "demo-
cratic principle" on which the Bank of the South must be based,
according to Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, would be undermined.
Moreover, were the contributions reduced according to the contributing
capacity of each member, the new bank might not be able to raise seven
billion dollars as initial capital, thereby losing competitiveness against
other institutions operating in the region. Hence, the debate as to the
contribution system that ought to be adopted shows once again the con-
siderable distance among the positions of the parties involved in the Bank
of the South and the difficulty of bringing such positions together.
C. No CONDITIONALITY
An important characteristic of the Bank of the South pointed out by
some of its supporters is that unlike the IMF, World Bank, and Inter-
American Development Bank, the new bank will not condition its loans
upon the implementation of neoliberal policy reforms like the ones in-
volved in the foregoing IFIs' programs, such as privatization of state en-
terprises, government deregulation, deep cuts in social spending, wage
139. McElhinny, supra note 15.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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freezes or cuts, unrestricted free market access for foreign corporations,
corporate-friendly tax cuts, and/or crackdowns on trade unions. 142 How-
ever, what "no conditionality" actually means remains unclear. The Ven-
ezuelan Minister of Finance Mr. Rodrigo Cabezas pointed out in an
October, 2007 conference in Washington D.C. that whereas IFIs have
conditioned their loans upon the implementation of structural programs
that derived in higher leverage, poverty, and inflation rates in the region,
the Bank of the South will be the "antithesis" of such a manner of financ-
ing, not only because its loans will not be conditioned by any "hege-
monic" policy, but also because all of its members will have the same
voting rights. In February, 2007, Argentina's former President Mr. Nes-
tor Kirchner declared that the Bank of the South would adopt a different
philosophy from that adopted by both the private lenders and the multi-
lateral banks.1 43 Brazil's Finance Minister, however, adopted a more cau-
tious position and called for "modesty and parsimony," and insisted that
the Bank of the South would not bailout unwise borrowers.1 44
If the premise of no conditionality meant that the Bank of the South
would not place any restrictions on repayment other than those estab-
lished under the terms of each loan, the new bank would face significant
obstacles in raising capital.1 45 So long as its members do not achieve in-
vestment grade credit rating, the Bank of the South will not be able to
access international credit markets independently or inexpensively.1 4 6
This will therefore increase the real cost of its loans that the Bank of the
South may choose to subsidize, not to mention whether the members
would be willing to subsidize loans made by the bank."47
Furthermore, the no conditionality premise that has been raised as a
cornerstone of the Bank of the South also governs transactions per-
formed by other multilateral banks operating in Latin America. The
CAF and the BNDES impose almost no policy condition upon the grant-
ing of its loans and, more importantly, have a high credit rating allowing
them to raise funds in the international markets at competitive rates.' 48
The CAF is among the debt issuers with the highest credit ratings in Latin
America and, during the last seven years, has had annual growth of 7.3
percent in its loan and equity investments portfolio, reaching a record of
U.S. $8.2 billion in 2006-96 percent of which was invested in South
America. 149 The BNDES, on the other hand, has a relatively non-trans-
142. Id.; Weisbrot, supra note 26.
143. El Banco del Sur Arranca, sin la Alegrfa Brasilefia, Feb. 22, 2007, http:I
www.paginal2.com.ar/diario/elpais/subnotas/1-26065-2007-02-22.html.
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parent and unaccounted-for lending process, 50 and its annual disburse-
ments of financial resources in the region have been increasing for the
last ten years.' 51
In addition, the IDB is also working to improve its competitiveness in
the region, especially against CAF and BNDES. In his speech at the IDB
Annual Meeting in April, 2008, IDB's President Mr. Luis Alberto
Moreno affirmed that all the seniors managers and division chiefs of the
IDB were "attracted by the opportunity to help create a new paradigm
for development finance" that is enabling the IDB "to offer new financial
products, faster service, expert advice and flexible solutions tailored to
the changing needs of individual governments and companies."'1 52 On
May 10, 2007, Mr. Moreno declared that in order to be competitive, "we
have to reinvent ourselves."' 153 During 2007, the IDB undertook an un-
precedented expansion of lending to the private sector in Latin America,
approving $2.3 billion for twenty-nine projects, up from $920 million for
twenty projects in 2006.154 Considering this data, one might argue that
the no conditionality premise will not only affect the new bank's ability to
borrow money in the international markets, but also has relative impor-
tance given the flexible terms under which other institutions operating in
the region grant their loans.
Certainly, in order to successfully compete against the other financial
institutions mentioned above, the Bank of the South will need to offer a
more specific and competitive advantage, other than the lack of condi-
tionality. To date, the advantage has not been offered.
V. CONCLUSION
Latin America is going through a favorable macroeconomic growth
trend and its main challenge consists of transforming the trend into sus-
tainable equity growth. In order to achieve this goal, new investment, at
competitive financing rates, needs to be made in various sectors of the
economy, such as energy, roads, and health. The Bank of South is an
attractive proposal that might perform an active role in such a process.
Indeed, the idea of a regional financing institution has not only been
poorly criticized, but also has received support from various sectors.
Although Brazil does not support the idea of creating a regional bank
as conceived by Mr. Chavez and his supporters, it has adhered to the
150. In relation to the BNDES' approval process of its operations, see BNDES, Flux
and Terms for the Due Execution of Operations, http://www.bndes.gov.brlenglish/
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fered by the CAF, see Andean Development Corporation, Productos y Servicios
[Products and Services], http://www.caf.com/view/index.asp?ms=17&pageMs=
34189 (last visited Sep. 2, 2008). Any policy reform mentioned therein is a condi-
tion for the granting of such products and services.
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proposal simply to protect its economic interests in the Venezuelaan
economy and ease Mr. Chavez's influence in the region. It seems un-
likely that Brazil is actually committed to the creation of the Bank of
South. Brazil's lack of commitment, and the absence of Chile, would
likely block successful implementation of the Bank of the South, just as
Brazil blocked the creation of a monetary institution by stripping it of its
vital, and innovative, monetary function. Furthermore, a one country,
one vote system introduces a serious obstacle that makes it difficult to
bring Brazilean and other economies' position together with regard to
what the contributions of the members should be.
Finally, the no conditionality premise raised as one the core character-
istics of the new bank would not only affect its ability to borrow funds
inexpensively or independently in the global markets, but would also
eventually add little competitive value to the loans of the Bank of the
South due to the light conditionality imposed by other financial institu-
tions operating in the region. For these reasons, therefore, I believe that
there are not enough conditions favorable to the Bank of the South in
order to implement it in a successful and competitive manner.
758 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 14
